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0"The growth of GDP may be measured up in the macroeconomic treetops, but
all the action is in the microeconomic undergrowth, where new limbs sprout, and
dead wood is cleared away."
￿ World Bank Commission on Growth and Development (2008, pp.2-3)
1 Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to develop a formal model to explain the industrial
dynamics along the path of economic growth in developing countries. We show how
the optimal leading industries are structurally di⁄erent at di⁄erent development
stages, depending mainly on the economy￿ s endowment structure and its evolution.
Sustained economic development from a low-income status to high-income status in
countries in modern times is characterized by continuous technological innovation
and industrial upgrading (see Chenery (1960), Kuznets (1966), Maddison (1980),
Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986), Hayami and Godo (2005)). Beneath the
GDP growth, the products or major industries in the manufacturing sector of these
economies are continuously changing over time. First labor-intensive goods such
as textiles and shoes are produced, then those industries decline and are gradually
replaced by the more capital-intensive industries such as machinery and electronics,
which also decline later while even more capital-intensive industries arise such as
cars and aircraft, and so forth. Such a pattern, as shown in Figure 1, was referred as
the ￿ ying geese pattern of economic development by Akamatsu (1962) in the 1930s
and further developed by Kojima (2000).
1Figure 1: Japan￿ s Industrial Upgrading and Product Evolution (Kojima, 2000)
Surprisingly, however, this continuous waxing and waning pattern of industrial
development has rarely been formalized in the growth and development literature,
although it has been well documented for a long time.1 Recall that most of the
earlier growth models aim to match the Kaldor facts and typically assume the same
aggregate production function for countries at di⁄erent development stages, which
naturally leads economists to focus on the cross-country di⁄erences in productivity
or human capital while ignoring the structural di⁄erences in the industries for
countries at di⁄erent development stages (see Kaldor (1961), Solow (1965), Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004)).2 Recent growth models do start to address various
types of structural change. Most of them mainly explore the long-run trend shift
in the compositions of aggregate agriculture, industry, and service sectors without
exploring the dynamics within the aggregate sectors, such as the continuous upgrading
of manufacturing industries. Consequently, they do not characterize the inverse-V-shaped
industrial dynamics described above. For example, Lucas (2004) studies the rural-urban
1There are some exceptions: Vernon (1965) develops a product-cycle argument to explain how
the location of production for a commodity might shift across countries over time. Schumpeter
(1942) expatiates the idea of creative destruction based on technology advancement instead of
capital endowment improvement, which is further developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992). Those
studies focused mainly on the R&D-driven mechanism of industrial evolution in developed countries
instead of developing countries.
2Kaldor facts refer to the relative constancy of the growth rate of total output, the capital-output
ratio, the real interest rate, and the share of labor income in GDP.
2transformation driven by the externality of human capital. Buera and Kaboski
(2009) focus on the expansion of the service sector. Some other works strive to
match Kuznets facts, which state that development is typically a process of a
decline in agriculture, a rise in services, and a hump-shaped change in industry.
In addition, that literature mainly focuses on the long-run (balanced or asymptotic)
growth rate (or steady state) without explicitly and completely characterizing the
whole dynamics for the structural change per se. Moreover, in those models the
structural changes are driven either by the demand shift in the consumption goods
as people get richer (see Laitner (2000), Caselli and Coleman (2001), Kongsamut,
Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002)), or by the di⁄erent
productivity growth across di⁄erent sectors as ￿rst suggested by Baumol (1967),
and further developed by Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Ngai and Pissarides
(2007). In this paper, we argue that the inverse-V-shaped industrial dynamics in
a developing country is driven mainly by the change in its endowment structure.
The endowments are given at any given time and changeable over time. One of
the key di⁄erences between a developed and developing country is the di⁄erence
in the relative abundance of capital in their endowment structures. The economic
development process in a developing country is characterized by the continuous
upgrading of its endowment structure from relatively scarce in capital and relatively
abundant in labor or natural resources to relatively abundant in capital and relative
scarce in labor/natural resources. Lin (2003, 2009) argues that the optimal industrial
structure in an economy at a given time should be consistent with the given endowment
structure at that time: as capital accumulates and becomes relatively cheaper, the
industries should optimally upgrade toward more capital-intensive ones accordingly.
Motivated by Lin￿ s argument, our model will show that the driving force for the
￿ ying-geese pattern of industrial upgrading in the development process of a developing
country is the continuous capital deepening in the endowment structure.
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) have examined how the capital deepening has an
3asymmetric impact on the sectors with di⁄erent capital intensities, but their main
objective is to study how the elasticity of substitution between two sectors with
di⁄erent capital shares a⁄ects the long-run asymptotic aggregate growth rate. Moreover,
their model has two sectors and is thus unable to explain the ￿ ying-geese pattern of
repetitive inverse-V-shaped industrial upgrading dynamics.
It is very important to understand the widely observed inverse-V-shaped industrial
dynamics in the process of economic development. What type of industry should
we expect to dominate at a certain stage of development? Would it be optimal
for the government in a low-income country to support the development of certain
industries that prevail in high-income countries? To answer these questions, it is
not enough to merely recognize the long-run structural change among the primary,
secondary, and tertiary sectors or in the rural-urban transformation.
In what follows, we develop a growth model featuring this inverse-V-shaped industrial
dynamics along the development path. The major force driving the structural
change is the increase in the capital-labor ratio (or alternatively, endowment structure).
As capital becomes more abundant and relatively cheaper, the more capital-intensive
industrial goods are produced, because the more capital-intensive industry products
are not only more a⁄ordable but also more desirable for the consumers. At the same
time, the more labor-intensive goods are gradually displaced. As capital becomes
even more abundant, goods with an even higher capital intensity become more
desirable to produce and consume. This generates the endless inverse-V-shaped
industrial dynamics. Our model underscores the key role played by the changes in
endowment structure rather than productivity increase. This might be reasonable
because our model is mainly geared toward developing economies where industrial
upgrading relies mainly on borrowing existing technologies from developed countries
(Hayami and Goto (2005)), in contrast to the developed economies where huge
research and development expenditure is required for technology innovation and
industrial upgrading.
4To highlight the industrial dynamics, we deviate from the standard practice in the
growth literature, which typically only focuses on the steady state or the long-run
(balanced or asymptotic) growth rate. Instead, we obtain the explicit solution for
the whole dynamics in the structural changes, even though we are considering a
dynamic economy with an in￿nitely dimensional commodity space and an in￿nite
time horizon.3 We decompose this seemingly complicated structural analysis into
two steps. First, along the time dimension, the representative household simply
decides the allocation of capital for producing consumption goods and savings. The
household￿ s capital allocation determines the evolution of capital endowment and the
intertemporal use of capital in production. Then, along the cross-section dimension,
the capital allocated for production determines the production structures (industrial
choices) as if it were a static model. Ultimately, the mathematical problem is
reduced to dynamic optimization with switching state equations. This approach,
which we call a dynamic structural analysis, can tremendously simplify the analysis
of perpetual industrial upgrading with long-run growth.
Our paper is related to the literature of quality-ladder growth models because in
our model di⁄erent industrial goods are modelled as perfect substitutes and are
produced with di⁄erent technologies. Aghion and Howitt (1992) emphasize that
the ￿rm￿ s incentives to earn monopolistic rents justify its endeavor to undertake
risky and costly R&D, which ultimately causes the creative destruction (also see
Grossman and Helpman, 1991a). Our model is methodologically closest in spirit to
Stokey (1988), who characterizes how the learning-by-doing keeps the band of the
produced commodities moving toward higher and higher qualities. The main goals of
that literature, however, are to generate sustained economic growth at the aggregate
level instead of trying to explain the inverse-V-shaped industrial dynamics. More
3There may be a technical reason why the well-recognized fact of industrial dynamics has
rarely been formalized in growth models. Closed-form solutions for transitional dynamics are
typically very hard to obtain even in most of the two-sector growth models, but the aforementioned
inverse-V-shaped industrial dynamics is by nature the transitional dynamics per se, so the industrial
upgrading with an in￿nite-dimensional commodity space appears even more unwieldy.
5importantly, all these papers try to emphasize the role of technological advancement
or knowledge accumulation with stable industries while our paper stresses the role
of capital accumulation and industrial upgrading. In addition, this literature, like
other growth models, also mainly studies the long-run balanced growth path while
leaving the transitional dynamics aside. The industrial climbing result in Stokey
(1988), for example, is obtained essentially through comparative statics rather than
the full-blown dynamic model. By contrast, we are able to provide the closed-form
solutions for all the dynamics.
Simple comparative statics in our static model shows how the change in the endowment
structure determines the changes in industrial structures, a result similar to the
Heckscher-Ohlin model with multiple diversi￿cation cones (see Leamer (1987), Schotter
(2003)). However, there is a nontrivial di⁄erence. These multiple diversi￿cation
cone models mainly consider open economies where the production structure of a
country is determined by international specialization. By contrast, in our closed
economy model, the households and ￿rms select endogenously which set of products
to consume and produce. More importantly, our dynamic model enables us to
obtain explicit solutions to characterize the whole inverse-V-shaped dynamics of
the in￿nite industrial upgrading, while H-O models with multiple diversi￿cation
cones are mostly static. To highlight the direct impact of endowment change on the
industrial dynamics, we purposefully ignore the e⁄ect of international specialization
according to comparative advantage and only consider a closed economy in this
paper.4 We suspect that our main proposition, namely, the change in endowment
structures drives the change in industrial structures, will be only strengthened
4Notice that in our paper a developing country is implicitly assumed to be able to freely borrow
the technology knowhow of more capital intensive industries from the developed countries. The
main conclusions of the model are expected to hold in an open economy model. Moreover, except
in an extremely small economy, the domestic market plays a major role in economic development.
For example, Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986) ￿nd that expansion in the domestic demand
accounted for a 72%-74% increase in domestic industrial output in those countries with population
larger than 20 million, and that even for small and manufacturing-oriented countries with population
less than 20 million, domestic demand expansion accounts for a 50%-60% increase in the total
industrial output. See Murphy, Shleifer and Vishy (1989) for more argument.
6in an open economy, as predicted by standard H-O trade models.5 Our model
characterizes the ￿rst-best scenario in which the industrial structures evolve optimally
in a perfectly competitive and frictionless economy. In such an ideal world, no
government intervenes and the market itself can identify and support the right
industries at each development stage. But what if the government pursues a wrong
development strategy and pushes the economy to develop some inappropriate industries?
We show in this paper that such policy mistakes may sometimes cause the economy
to fall into a poverty trap such that long-run growth becomes impossible without
foreign help. The markets are far from perfect in the real world, so it may be
desirable for the government to have an industrial policy which will help to provide
￿rms with information, coordinate ￿rms￿investments and compensate for externalities
produced by pioneer ￿rms (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), Lin (2009)). However,
the prerequisite for a successful industrial policy is to identify what type of industries
should be supported at each di⁄erent development stage. Our ￿rst-best characterization
sets a theoretical benchmark that may potentially help us think further about these
issues.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the static model. The dynamic
model is analyzed in Sections 3 and 4. Welfare consequences of the mistakes in
industrial choices are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Technical proofs
and derivations are put in the Appendix.
2 Static Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a closed developing economy with a unit mass of identical households.
Each household is endowed with L units of labor and E units of capital, which
5Ventura (1997) shows theoretically how factor-price-equalization driven by international trade
can explain the rapid catching-up growths of several export-oriented East Asian economies.
Krugman (1979) constructs a North-South trade model to explore how the catching up process
depends on whether the rich country￿ s innovation speed exceeds the poor country￿ s imitation speed.
7conceptually consists of both tangible physical capital and intangible capital. For
parsimony purpose, we will narrowly interpret this "composite capital" as physical
capital from now on in this qualitative investigation. The given commodity space
has in￿nite dimensions. Let cn denote the consumption of good n = 0;1;2;::. In
particular, good 0 may be interpreted as a household product, and good n for n ￿ 1





where the quality coe¢ cient for good i is ￿n.6 We require cn ￿ 0 for any n: The




; where ￿ 2 (0;1]: (1)
All the production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale. In particular,
good 0 is produced with labor only. One unit of labor produces one unit of good 0.
For any industrial good n = 1;2;3;:::; both labor and capital are required and the





6This assumption is quite standard in the vertical innovation growth literature. The
speci￿cation is also mathematically isomorphic to the following alternative economic interpretation:
C is the ￿nal good while all the cn;n = 0;1;2;::: are intermediate goods, so ￿n should be
interpreted as the "productivity" for good n. It is not unusual in growth literature to assume perfect
substitutability for the output across di⁄erent production activities. For example, the agricutural
Malthus production and the modern Solow production are two linearly additive components for the
total output in Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Lucas (2009). A further discussion will be devoted
to this "perfect substitutability" assumption later.
7This assumption drastically simpli￿es the dynamic strucutral analysis partly by giving us a
lot of linearities. In the Appendix, we show that the main results remain valid with Cobb-Douglass
function, but the dynamic analysis will be much more complex. Houthakker (1956) shows that
Leontief production functions with Pareto-distribution heterogenous paratermers can aggregate
into Cobb-Douglass production functions. Lagos (2006) constructs another distribution that can
aggregate heterogenous Leontief functions into CES production functions. These may be helpful in
understanding how ￿rm heterogeneities may a⁄ect our results, which is a very interesting research
direction.
8where an is the capital intensity of producing one unit of good n: All the markets
are perfectly competitive. Let pn denote the price of good n. Let r denote the rental
price of capital and w denote the wage rate. Thus, ￿rm￿ s zero pro￿t function implies
that p0 = w and pn = w + anr for n = 1;2;3;::.
We assume
￿n = ￿n; an = an (3)
￿ > 1; a > 1, and a ￿ 1 > ￿: (4)
Therefore, a higher-index good has a higher quality but is more capital intensive.
The last inequality in (4) not only rules out the trivial case that only the highest
quality good is produced in any equilibrium, but also simpli￿es our analysis, as will
be clear shortly.




pncn = wL + rE (5)
Set up the Lagrangian with the multiplier denoted by ￿, and we obtain the following







￿ ￿pn; for 8n ￿ 0; (6)
￿ = ￿when cn > 0:
2.2 Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium is determined by the endowment structure (capital per
capita), E
L: In the Appendix, we show that at most two goods are produced simultaneously
in the equilibrium and that these two goods have to be adjacent in capital intensities.
The intuition is the following: Suppose goods n and n + 1 are produced for some
9n ￿ 1. From consumer￿ s maximization problem, we immediately have























aj￿1(a￿￿) for any j = 1;2;::. Therefore, when r
w = ￿￿1
an(a￿￿), good n+1 must be
strictly preferred to good n + 2; because the marginal rate of substitution is larger
than their relative price. This means that cj = 0 for all j ￿ n + 2. Using the same
logic, we can also verify that cj = 0 for all 1 ￿ j ￿ n￿1. In addition, condition (4)
ensures that good 0 will not be produced, as can be veri￿ed by simply comparing
the marginal rate of substitution between good n and good 0 and their price ratio.
Similarly, when goods 0 and 1 are produced, we can show that good 1 is strictly
preferred to any good n ￿ 2:
The market clearing conditions for labor and capital are
cn + cn+1 = L (8)
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Figure 2. How Endowment Stucture Determines Optimal Industries
The market equilibrium can be illustrated graphically in Figure 2, where labor
and capital are represented by horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. O represents




are the vectors of factors used in producing cn and cn+1 in the equilibrium. Let
point W = (L;E) be the factor endowment of the country. If W = anL; only
good n is produced. Similarly, if W = an+1L; only good n + 1 is produced. When
anL < W < an+1L; both goods n and n+1 are produced. The factor market clearing
conditions, (8) and (9), determine the usages of labor and capital in industries n
and n+1; which are represented by vector OA and vector OB in the parallelogram
OAWB, respectively. If the capital endowment increases from W to W0; the new
equilibrium becomes parallelogram OA0W0B0 so that cn decreases but cn+1 increases.
More precisely, the equilibrium output of each commodity cn, the relative factor
prices r
w; and the corresponding aggregate output C are summarized in the following
table.
11Table 1: Static Equilibrium
0 ￿ E ￿ aL anL ￿ E < an+1L for n ￿ 1
c0 = L ￿ E
a cn = Lan+1￿E
an+1￿an
c1 = E
a cn+1 = E￿anL
an+1￿an







C = L + (￿ ￿ 1)E




, E0;1 = a








The whole static equilibrium is summarized verbally in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a closed economy, the static market equilibrium is determined
by the endowment structure, E
L: Generically, only two goods adjacent in capital
intensities are produced in equilibrium. As capital per capita increases, every commodity
exhibits an inverse-V-shaped life cycle. A good enters the market, prospers (its
output increases) and then declines, and ￿nally is fully replaced by another product
with a higher capital intensity. The ratio of the interest rate to the wage rate declines
as E
L increases.
Figure 3 shows that the relative factor prices r
w, which declines in a stair- shaped
fashion as E increases. This discontinuity results from the Leontief production
assumption but the ￿ at part is more general: During the structural change, resource





































Figure 3. How Relative Factor Price Ratios Depend on Endowment Structure








a￿1 L when E 2 [anL;an+1L] for any n ￿ 1. So the capital
share monotonically increases with capital during each diversi￿cation cone and then
suddenly drops to
(￿￿1)
a￿1 as the economy enters a di⁄erent diversi￿cation cone, but it
always falls into the following interval [￿￿1
a￿1;
(￿￿1)a
(a￿1)￿] for any development stage with
n ￿ 1. This result is consistent with the Kaldor fact that the capital share is fairly
stable over time (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for more discussions on the
robustness of Kaldor facts).
How cn changes has already been encoded in Figure 2 but its inverse-V-shaped
pattern can be more intuitively seen in Figure 4. When capital endowment E reaches
threshold value anL; good n + 1 enters the market, and its output increases as E
increases up to the point E = an+1L and then it declines. At the point E = an+2L;




















Figure 4. How Each Industry Depends on the Endowment
The above equilibrium in our closed economy model turns out to be very similar
to the H-O trade model with multiple diversi￿cation cones. However, the main
mechanisms are totally di⁄erent. Leamer (1987) and other papers in this literature
mainly consider (small) open economies where the production structure of a country
is determined by international specialization and each good has to be consumed.
In our closed-economy general equilibrium model, which set of goods should be
consumed and produced is an endogenous decision, depending solely on the domestic
demand and endogenous relative factor prices, which are mainly dictated by the
endowment structure.
3 Dynamic Model
In this section, we will develop a dynamic model to capture the complete industrial
dynamics along the path of economic growth. The key idea is to break down the
evolution analysis of production structures into two steps. Along the time dimension,
the representative consumer decides her intertemporal consumption ￿ ows of the
aggregate good C and makes the saving and investment decisions. This dynamic
decision determines the evolution of endowment structure K
L and the optimal capital
14expenditure E
L at every time point t: In the cross section dimension, the capital
expenditure E
L then determines the production structures, exactly the same as in
the static model.
By the second Welfare Theorem, we can characterize the competitive equilibrium










K = ￿K(t) ￿ E(C(t)) (10)
K0 is given:
where ￿ is the time discount rate. K(t) is the amount of working capital at t. At
each time, the old capital can be transformed into new working capital using the
standard AK model technology and ￿ is the exogenous technology parameter net of
the depreciation rate. All the new working capital can be used to either produce the
consumption good or to save/invest. E(C(t)) is the total capital used to produce
the aggregate consumption C(t). All the consumption goods are non-storable. The
total labor endowment L is constant over time.8 To ensure positive consumption
growth, we assume ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0. To exclude the explosive solution, we also assume
￿￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) < ￿. Putting them together, we assume
0 < ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿: (11)
From Table 1, we know that E(C) is a strictly increasing, continuous, piece-wise
linear function of C. It is not di⁄erentiable at C = ￿iL, for any i = 0;1;:::.
Therefore, the above dynamic problem may involve changes in the functional forms
8It is straightforward to examine how exogenous changes in the ￿e⁄ective labor￿(for example,
let L(t) = L0e
￿t for some ￿ > 0) may a⁄ect economic dynamics.




> > > > <
> > > > :
￿K; when C ￿ L
￿K ￿ E0;1(C); when L ￿ C ￿ ￿L
￿K ￿ En;n+1(C); when ￿nL ￿ C ￿ ￿n+1L; for n ￿ 1
;
where En;n+1(C) is de￿ned in Table 1 for any n ￿ 0. We can easily verify that,
in this dynamic optimization problem, the objective function is strictly increasing,
di⁄erentiable and strictly concave while the constraint set forms a continuous convex-valued
correspondence, hence the equilibrium must exist and also be unique.
Let t0 denote the last time point when the aggregate consumption equals L; and
tn denote the ￿rst time point when C = ￿nL for n ￿ 1: As can be shown later, the
aggregate consumption C is monotonically increasing over time in the equilibrium,



















> > > > <
> > > > :
￿K when 0 ￿ t ￿ t0
￿K ￿ E0;1(C); when t0 ￿ t ￿ t1
￿K ￿ En;n+1(C); when tn ￿ t ￿ tn+1; for n ￿ 1
;
K0 is given:
According to Table 1, in time period t0 ￿ t ￿ t1; goods 0 and 1 are produced
and E(C) ￿ E0;1(C) = a
￿￿1(C ￿ L), while in time period tn ￿ t ￿ tn+1 for n ￿ 1;








If K0 is smaller than a certain threshold value (to be discussed soon), then there
exists a time period 0 ￿ t ￿ t0 in which only good 0 is produced and all the working
16capital is saved for the future, so that E = 0 when 0 ￿ t ￿ t0. If K0 is large, on
the other hand, the economy may start with producing good h and h + 1 for some
h ￿ 1, so t0 = t1 = ￿￿￿ = th = 0 in the equilibrium.
To solve the above dynamic problem, following Kamien and Schwartz (1991),
we set the discounted-value Hamiltonian in the interval of tn ￿ t ￿ tn+1, and use




e￿￿t + ￿n;n+1 [￿K(t) ￿ En;n+1(C(t))]
+￿n+1
n;n+1(￿n+1L ￿ C(t)) + ￿n
n;n+1(C(t) ￿ ￿nL) (12)
where ￿n;n+1 is the co-state variable, ￿n+1
n;n+1 and ￿n
n;n+1 are the Lagrangian multipliers
for the two constraints ￿n+1L ￿ C(t) ￿ 0 and C(t) ￿ ￿nL ￿ 0, respectively. The
￿rst order and K-T conditions are
@Hn;n+1
@C
= C(t)￿￿e￿￿t ￿ ￿n;n+1
an+1 ￿ an





n;n+1(￿n+1L ￿ C(t)) = 0; ￿n+1
n;n+1 ￿ 0;￿n+1L ￿ C(t) ￿ 0
￿n
n;n+1(C(t) ￿ ￿nL) = 0; ￿n







In particular, when C(t) 2 (￿nL;￿n+1L), ￿n+1
n;n+1 = ￿n




￿n+1 ￿ ￿n: (15)
The left hand side is the marginal utility gain by increasing one unit of aggregate
consumption, while the right hand side is the marginal utility loss due to the decrease
in capital because of that additional unit of consumption, which by chain￿ s rule
17can be decomposed into two multiplicative terms: The marginal utility of capital
￿n;n+1 and the marginal capital requirement for each additional unit of aggregate
consumption an+1￿an
￿n+1￿￿n (see Table 1). Taking log of both sides of equation (15) and








for tn ￿ t ￿ tn+1 for any n ￿ 0. The strictly concave utility function implies that the
optimal consumption ￿ ow C(t) must be continuous and su¢ ciently smooth (with
no kinks) throughout the time, hence from (16) we obtain:
C(t) = C(t0)e
￿￿￿
￿ (t￿t0) for any t ￿ t0: (17)
Following Kamien and Schwartz (1991), we have two additional necessary
conditions at t = tn+1:
Hn;n+1(tn+1) = Hn+1;n+2(tn+1) (18)
￿n;n+1(tn+1) = ￿n+1;n+2(tn+1) (19)
Substituting equations (18) and (19) into (12), we can verify that K￿(tn+1) =
K+(tn+1). In other words, K(t) is indeed continuous.
Observe that C(t0)e
￿￿￿








mn ￿ tn+1 ￿ tn, which measures the length of the period when both good n and
n + 1 are produced. It is easy to see that
mn = m ￿
￿ log￿
￿ ￿ ￿
;8n ￿ 1 (20)
This result is summarized in the following proposition, where the goods at di⁄erent
18levels should be interpreted as di⁄erent industries.9 These industries di⁄er in the
capital intensities of their production technologies.
Proposition 2 The duration of each diversi￿cation cone for goods n and n + 1is
identical for all n ￿ 1. The speed of industrial upgrading (measured by 1
m) strictly
increases with the e¢ ciency of the production of capital goods, ￿; and intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, 1
￿, but strictly decreases with the quality gap ￿ and time
discount rate ￿:
The intuition is the following: when the household is more impatient (larger ￿),
it will consume more and save less, causing the industrial upgrade to slow down.
When the quality gap is larger (larger ￿), the marginal utility of the current goods
are bigger, therefore it pays to stay longer. When the production of the capital
good becomes more e¢ cient (￿), capital can be accumulated faster, so the upgrade
speed is increased. When the aggregate consumption is more substitutable across
time, the household is more willing to sacri￿ce the current consumption so long as
the aggregate consumption in the future can get su¢ ciently larger, which requires
quicker industrial upgrading.
4 Industrial Dynamics
We are now ready to derive the industrial dynamics for the entire time period.
The industrial dynamics depends on the initial capital stock, K(0): We show in the
9To obtain closed-form solutions for the whole dynamics with in￿nite dimensional commodity
space, we make the strong assumption that di⁄erent industrial goods are perfectly substitutable so
that some industries can die out. However, we believe this assumption is not crucial for our main
result in industrial dynamics, depending on how the model is interpreted. For example, we may
alternatively interpret each good n as a composite of several imperfectly substitutable industrial
goods (such as food, clothes, electronics, etc.) similar to Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). The
quality of the goods in each of these industries will improve over time, and the capital intensity of
their technologies will also increase over time, which is re￿ ected in the properties of the aggregate
good n. We conjecture that the aggregate output of each industry (weighted sum over all the goods
of di⁄erent qualities in the same industry) will maintain the inverse-V-shaped dynamic pattern,
although no industries will vanish (but some goods at certain quality levels will). We will leave this
for future research.
19Appendix that there exists a series of increasing constants, #0;#1;￿￿￿ ;#n;#n+1;￿￿￿ ;
such that if 0 < K(0) ￿ #0; the economy will start by producing good 0 only until the
capital stock reaches #0 (Appendix 3 fully characterizes this case); if #0 < K(0) ￿
#1; the economy will start by producing goods 0 and 1; if #n < K(0) ￿ #n+1; the
economy will start by producing goods n and n+1: Furthermore, we can show that
K(tn) ￿ #n for any K(0) < #n: That is, irrespective of the level of initial capital
stock, the economy always starts to produce good n+1 when its capital stock reaches
#n:
To be more concrete, let us consider the case when #0 < K(0) ￿ #1, where
threshold values #0 and #1 can be explicitly solved out (see the Appendix). That is,
the economy will start by producing goods 0 and 1: Using equation (17) and Table









￿ t ￿ L):
Correspondingly,
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￿n+1 ￿ ￿n when t 2 [tn;tn+1], for any n ￿ 1:
(22)
Solving the di⁄erential equation (22), we obtain:
K(t) = ￿n + ￿ne
￿￿￿
















































Note that C(0) can be uniquely determined by using the transversality condition
(see the Appendix). f#ng
1
n=2 are all constants, which can sequentially pinned down:
#n ￿ K(tn) can be computed from equation (23) with K(tn￿1) known.




> > > > <











￿￿1; when t 2 [tn;tn+1]
0; otherwise




> > > > <






















￿￿1 ; when t 2 [t0;t1]
0; otherwise
:

















2 t 4 t
Figure 5. How Industries Evolve over Time when K0 2 (#0;#1)
The above mathematical results can be read as follows:
Proposition 3 There exist a strictly increasing and non-negative sequence of threshold
values for capital stock, f#ig
1
i=0 , which are all independent of the initial capital stock,
such that the economy starts to produce good n when its capital stock K(t) reaches
#n￿1: K(t) evolves following the equation (23), while the total consumption C(t)
remains constant at L until t0, after which it grows exponentially at the constant
rate
￿￿￿
￿ : The output of each industry evolves in an inverse-V-shaped pattern: When
capital stock K(t) reaches #n￿1; good n enters the market and its output grows
approximately at the constant rate
￿￿￿
￿ until capital stock K(t) reaches #n; its output
then declines approximately at the constant rate
￿￿￿
￿ ; and exits from the market at
the time when K(t) reaches #n+1:10




￿￿1; grows at the
constant rate
￿￿￿




￿￿1 declines at the constant rate
￿￿￿
￿ :
225 "Mistakes" in Product Selection and Consequences
Our previous analysis characterizes the ￿rst-best industrial dynamics in a frictionless
economy. The evolution of optimal production structure is determined by the change
of capital per capita, K(t)=L; which evolves following equation (23). In this section,
we will brie￿ y discuss the welfare consequences if the goods chosen to produce are
not the ￿rst-best ones. These ￿selection mistakes￿ may happen in real life for a
variety of reasons. For example, the government in a developing economy may, for
some political reasons, pursue a catching-up development strategy by prematurely
pushing the economy to produce what is produced in the much more developed
economies, which is too capital intensive (see Lin 2003, 2008), that is, the economy
is urged to produce good n+s when good n is the ￿rst best for some s ￿ 1. Or the
market itself may fail to choose optimal products, due to incomplete information or
￿rms￿monopoly behavior, etc. Due to space limitations, we will focus our analysis
on the ex-post welfare consequences per se while remaining agnostic about what
causes those deviations from the ￿rst-best industrial selections.
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Figure 6. What Happens if Wrong Industrial Choice is Made
The optimal evolution of capital stock K(t); and capital expenditure E(t) are
represented by curve KK(t) and EE(t) in Figure 6, respectively. At time tn;
23K(tn) = #n and E(tn) = anL. It is optimal for the economy to start producing
good n+1 so that both good n and good n+1 should be produced at time interval
(tn;tn+1). Now suppose, for some unexpected and exogenous reasons, the economy
starts to produce goods n+s and n+s+1 during the period [tn;tn+1] for some s > 0:
s measures the magnitude of the industrial deviation. So at time tn; instead of using
E(tn) = anL; now suppose the economy chooses the expenditure E(tn) = an+sL and
maintains the same consumption growth rate
￿￿￿
￿ during this period. We use the
superscript ￿M￿to denote all the variables after the economy is unexpectedly hit
by this ￿mistake.￿What will the welfare consequence be?
Obviously at time tn, the aggregate consumption jumps from C(tn) to CM(tn).












for any t 2 [tn;tn+1]. It is represented by curve EM
n EM
n+1 in Figure 6. Di⁄erent












￿n+s+1 ￿ ￿n+s, for any t 2 [tn;tn+1]:
(24)
If s is su¢ ciently large, the capital expenditure EM(t) exceeds ￿KM(t) and therefore
KM(t) declines in time period [tn;tn+1]: In that case, capital stock evolves along
the curve KM
n KM
n+1 which is not only below the ￿rst-best path KK(t) but also
decreasing. At time tn+1; KM(tn+1) < #n+1: Let us assume #h ￿ KM(tn+1) ￿ #h+1
for some 0 < h < n: Suppose at time t = tn+1 the government (or agents) in the
economy suddenly realizes that it made mistakes during the period [tn;tn+1]. What
should it do? There are two scenarios:
In Scenario 1, let us assume there is no adjustment cost to rectify the mistake.
The economy can freely re-optimize everything at t = tn+1 at given capital stock
24K = KM(tn+1). Since #h ￿ KM(tn+1) ￿ #h+1, the economy will immediately
downgrade its production structure and start producing goods h and h + 1. The
corresponding capital expenditure EM(t+
n+1) must be between ahL and ah+1L, and
the economy will then follow the optimal path as if it began with K = KM(tn+1):







1 (t); respectively. Consumers enjoy the goods with qualities higher
than the optimal, n + s and n + s + 1; in time period [tn;tn+1]; but have to adjust
the economy at a much lower level thereafter. The consumer￿ s life utility following
the mistaken path KKM
n KM
n+1KM
1 (t) certainly is lower than the optimum and can
be computed. Similarly, if the country saves more capital than the optimum, and
produces goods n ￿ s and n ￿ s + 1 in [tn;tn+1]; the country will re-optimize and
start to produce goods j and j+1 for some j ￿ n+1 after t = tn+1; that also lowers
consumer￿ s lifetime total utility.
In Scenario 2, let us assume that the production structure can not be reversed
and maintain the full employment assumption. That is, when the economy starts
to produce good m; it can not produce any good with the quality lower than m
in the future. Full employment implies that the quantity of total consumption can
not decrease either. The industrial irreversibility may be due to the fact that the
physical capital used to produce high quality goods can not be reversed to produce
lower quality goods, or consumers who are used to consuming high-quality goods are
simply addicted to their consumer behavior, or political groups in current industries
may lobby against the structural adjustment. Under this assumption, the optimal
choice is to produce the lowest quality good constrained by the downward rigidity
constraint n ￿ h + s + 1. Therefore, at each time point after t = tn+1 capital
expenditure E must always equal ah+s+1L. As too little capital is saved, KM(t)
continues to decline after tn+1 and will be exhausted at time T: The evolution







2 (t)T; respectively. Due to the adjustment rigidity, a short-term
25mistake in production selection hurts the economy permanently by fully exhausting
all capital stock. The economy falls into a poverty trap without any growth and can
only a⁄ord to produce good 0 forever after time T, if that is allowed after T.
Scenarios 1 and 2 provide two extreme cases for the e⁄ect of mistakes in production
selection. Without adjustment cost, one period mistake to produce products above
the optimum lowers social welfare and postpones future product upgrading. When
the production structure is not reversible, however, one period over-expenditure in
capital may permanently degenerate the economy and destroy the hope for growth.
We can impose the same downward adjustment rigidity constraint on the economy
analyzed in the previous two sections, but nothing changes because this adjustment
constraint is simply not binding.
An intermediate adjustment cost function between Scenarios 1 and 2 may be
more realistic, but also more complicated to analyze. For example, we may assume
that right after time tn+1; capital stock K(t+
n+1) = ￿([h ￿ (n + 1)])K(tn+1) where
￿(:) is the adjustment cost function. ￿(0) = 1, 0 ￿ ￿(:) ￿ 1, and ￿(:) becomes
larger if the absolute value of [h ￿ (n + 1)] increases. If the economy maintains
its current production structures, there will be no adjustment cost. Otherwise, a
more radical adjustment incurs a higher adjustment cost. Scenario 1 represents
the case that ￿(:) ￿ 1. For Scenario 2, it simply refers to the case that ￿(:) ￿ 0 if
h￿(n+1) < 0. When ￿(:) is intermediate, the economy may not immediately adjust
her production structures to the optimal products h and h+1. Instead, the country
may gradually downgrade its production structure to the optimal one determined
by its endowment structure. A thorough formal exploration is beyond the scope of
this paper, but studies of such optimal adjustment in production structures seem
very interesting, although quite limited in the literature.
In the real world, we observed successful examples of industrial upgrading in
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from the 1950s to the 1980s. That may be
partly attributed to the fact that the government in those economies pursued the
26right industrial development policies that were consistent with their endowment
structures. However, there are many examples of less successful development with
￿non-optimal￿industrial dynamics in developing economies including China, India,
Russia, and many other Eastern European and Latin American countries during
various historical periods. These countries all erroneously pursued development
strategies that de￿ed their comparative advantages by naively trying to quickly
mimic the production structure of the developed economies and, hence, prematurely
built too many heavy industries that were inconsistent with the economy￿ s endowment
structure. That ultimately resulted in serious economic stagnation and caused huge
welfare loss. Just as predicted by our above analysis, the welfare consequence is
even worse when the industrial adjustment is more costly. Indeed, we frequently
observe prolonged di¢ cult periods of adjustment in many economies undertaking
reforms. For instance, it has been more than 15 years since the regime switched
in Russia and the country￿ s endowment structure also dramatically deteriorated.
Nevertheless, military and some other heavy industries are still the main supporting
industries in that country (Lin 2003, 2009).
Serious welfare consequences may result from the government￿ s failure to recognize
that the optimal industries are actually endogenous to the development stage (capital
endowment). Such important policy implications, although indirectly derived from
this model, may not be obvious from the standard one-sector or multi-sector growth
models.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a tractable in￿nite-horizon general-equilibrium model to analyze
the optimal industrial structure and its dynamics in a closed developing economy.
Explicit solutions are obtained to fully characterize the whole economic dynamics
(including the transitional dynamics), although the commodity space is in￿nitely
27dimensional. Our model generates an inverse-V-shaped dynamic pattern of industrial
change, which is widely observed in the real world but rarely, if ever, formalized in
growth models. The engine that drives this continuous structural change is the
increasing relative abundance of capital in the endowment structure. In a closed
economy, capital keeps accumulating because the capital goods are produced with
Arrow￿ s AK model technology, which can be interpreted as learning-by-doing in
the capital production. This endogenous technological change in the capital good
production gives us the sustained and constant economic growth in the aggregate
good consumption. However, since the industries are upgrading in a waxing-and-waning
fashion all the time, the growth rates of each individual industrial good are shown
to be changing along the process. We highlight the endogeneity of the industrial
structures and its dynamics: The optimal industrial choice and industrial dynamics
are dictated by the economy￿ s endowment structure and its change.
Economic growth and industrial upgrading are two crucial and integrated aspects
of sustained economic development. On the quantitative side, sustained economic
development requires the sustainable growth of per capita income; on the structural
side, sustainable economic development typically entails the continuous upgrading
and transformation of industries. Most existing growth models postulate the same
aggregate production function (with changing inputs and productivity) for all the
countries at di⁄erent development stages, and, thus, naturally focus on the quantitative
side of economic aggregates, which have been guiding economists to conduct many
insightful policy studies such as how to boost human and physical capital accumulation
and how to enhance technological improvement, and so forth. However, the structural
side is largely ignored by these models. This perhaps accounts for the more
serious shortage of academic and policy research related to structural changes in
development: How to help the economy identify the optimal products and industries
to develop at each di⁄erent development stage, which kind of ￿nancial institutions
can best serve the corresponding industrial structures at di⁄erent stages, how to
28facilitate the structural transformation in the process of labor and capital reallocation
across industries, how openness may a⁄ect a country￿ s industry upgrading, and,
consequently, what the optimal industrial, ￿nancial, trade, and many other macroeconomic
policies should be at di⁄erent development stages, so on and so forth. We hope the
model developed in this paper may serve as a useful starting point to address all
these fundamental issues.
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7.1 Appendix 1
In Appendix 1, we show that in the competitive equilibrium, if two di⁄erent industrial
goods are produced simultaneously, these two goods have to be adjacent in quality.
Proof: By contradiction. Suppose the above statement is not true, then there
can exist some good j and good m such that 1 ￿ j ￿ m ￿ 2 , and cj and cm are
both strictly positive in the equilibrium. Then






















which is equivalent to
￿n ￿ 1
an ￿ ￿n <
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ a
, for some integer n ￿ m ￿ j ￿ 2: (25)
This is true because
￿n ￿ 1






































for any n ￿ 2:
Therefore, it contradicts that good j is produced and consumed.
It￿ s straightforward to show that it is possible to have both good 0 and good 1
under some conditions.
Now we need to show that if some good n ￿ 2 is the only industrial good that￿ s
produced, then good 0 can not be produced. From (6), we know that the household















an+1 ￿ ￿an; (26)





an ￿ ￿an￿1: (27)
This means
￿ ￿ 1





an ￿ ￿an￿1: (28)
If c0 > 0, then ￿n = w+anr






So we must have
￿ ￿ 1












However, since a￿1 > ￿, there will exist no integer n ￿ 2 that can satisfy the above
inequality because the left hand side is no smaller than ￿ + 1. This implies that
c0 = 0.
7.2 Appendix 2
In Appendix 2, we solve for the initial value of total consumption C(0) when #0 <
K(0) ￿ #1, and also show how to derive the threshold values for #i;i = 0;1;2;:::.

















































































thus we must have lim
t!1









￿ t ￿ L);
Correspondingly,
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; for any n ￿ 2 (33)























The transversality condition lim
t!1
K(t)e￿￿t = 0 implies that
￿
￿￿￿









































(35) is needed to ensure #0 > 0. It says that capital accumulation speed ￿ has to
be su¢ ciently large relative to the capital intensity parameter a so that industrial
upgrading is indeed happening. (36) ensures #1 ￿ K(t1) > 0 and B < 0. Note that
(36) guarantees that ￿ > ￿:



































We can verify that the right hand side is strictly positive. Observe that the left
hand side is a strictly decreasing function of C(0), therefore we can uniquely pin
down the optimal C￿(0). (37) immediately implies
@C￿(0)
@K0 > 0 and
@C￿(0)
@L > 0.
Note that (34) implies that K(t1) does not depend on K(0), therefore (33) tells
that K(tn) for all n ￿ 1 are independent from K(0):
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In Appendix 3, we prove that there exists a series of constant numbers, #0;#1;￿￿￿ ;#n;#n+1;￿￿￿ ;
if 0 < K(0) ￿ #0; the economy will start from producing good 0 only until the capital
stock reaches #0; if #0 < K(0) ￿ #1; the economy will start from producing goods
0 and 1; if #n < K(0) ￿ #n+1; the economy will start from producing goods n and
n + 1: Furthermore, K(tn) = #n for any value of K(0) < #n:
Now let us characterize the solution to the above dynamic problem when K0 2
(0;#0] while keeping all the other assumptions unchanged. The economy must start
by producing good 0 only. The discounted-value Hamiltonian with the Lagrangian




e￿￿t + ￿0￿K(t) + ￿0
0(L ￿ C(t)):




0(L ￿ C(t)) = 0;







They immediately imply that C￿(t) = L: This is because labor entails no utility cost
for the household therefore C(t) must be equal to L when only good 0 is produced.
No capital is used for production and therefore
￿
K(t) = ￿K(t):
When capital stock K exceeds #0 by an in￿nitessimal amount, the economy produces
both good 0 and good 1. From that point on, the problem is exactly the same as










L; when t ￿ t0
Le
￿￿￿
￿ (t￿t0); when t > t0
:
Let tj denote the time point when only good j is produced, for any j ￿ 1. Observe
that Le
￿￿￿
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e￿(t￿t0); for t 2 [t0;t1]



















































j for any j ￿ 1, K(t0) = #0; and K(tn) is exactly the
same as before for any n ￿ 1.
Using the similar algorithm, we can fully specify the transitional dynamics when
K0 > #1. We have already provided an algorithm to compute #i for i ￿ 2 in the
main text by using (33). An alternative way is to back out the threshold value #i
from the corresponding transversality conditions for any i ￿ 2. It can be veri￿ed
that all these values are the same for both algorithms, and that all these threshold
values are independent of K0. In other words, K0 only has level e⁄ect (i.e. it only
a⁄ects C(0)) but no speed e⁄ect on industrial upgrading. The main reason is that
this economy is perfectly stationary, thus di⁄erent initial capital levels only translate
into di⁄erent initial aggregate consumption and initial industrial structures.
7.4 Appendix 4
This appendix is to illustrate that the assumption of Leontief production function
is not crucial for the main qualitative results. Suppose the production function is






where capital share ￿i strictly increases with i but always belongs to interval [0;1] .
The total output is
P
i Yi. Consider the simplest static case in which there are only
two industries: i = 1 and 2. The total labor and capital endowment are L and E.



































































































2, the economy only produces good 2 with total output F (E;L) =
A2E￿2L1￿￿2.
In addition, the aggregate production function F (E;L) is constant return to
scale, continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly monotone and concave. This result can
be most clearly seen in the following ￿gure, which plots the output per worker
(y =
F(E;L)















Figure 7: Structural Change with Cobb-Douglass Production Function
The straight line y = ak + b is tangent to the production function curve y = A1k￿1
when k = k￿
1, and tangent to curve y = A2k￿2 when k = k￿
2. So when k 2 (k￿
1;k￿
2),
the aggregate production function is just given by the cotangent line. Moreover,








1 , and the












39So the interest rate and wage rate both keep constant when both good 1 and good 2
are produced. The same logic can be extended to the case with an in￿nite-dimensional
commodity space, in which case the aggregate production function is simply the
convex envelope of all the individual industry production functions although those
in￿nitely many tangent points seem harder to analytically characterize in a general
and very neat way as in the Leonteif production function case. This problem is also
carried into the dynamic analysis, but it should be clear that the main qualitative
results would still remain valid.
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